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Abstract

The current outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa is the worst so far.• The unprecedented extent of
mortality and morbidity in this outbreak has followed more from imposition of neoliberal economic policies
on the countries affected than from the biological virulence of Ebola virus. • The lack of vaccines and
medications for Ebola virus disease is evidence that markets cannot reliably supply treatments for epidemic
diseases.• We attribute the current difficulties in containmentchiefl y to the erosion or non-development of
the health and medical infrastructure needed to respond effectively, as a direct result of market-privileging
policies imposed in the interests of wealthy nations.• These events and responses hold lessons for public
health priorities in Australia.
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T

he current outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD)
in West Africa is the worst so far. As of 20 August
2014, 2240 confirmed cases and 1229 deaths have
been recorded by the World Health Organization.1
While the possibility of an EVD outbreak in Australia
should not worry us,2 the social, economic and political
conditions associated with the present outbreak should.
EVD has been characterised as an African disease spread
through African culture.3 However, we argue that many
aspects of this outbreak represent a continuation of crises
whose root cause lies in neoliberal economic policies
that emphasise the free market as the primary driver of
economic growth, innovation and allocation of resources.4
Two aspects of the outbreak and the way in which it
has been managed support this contention. First, the lack
of vaccines and medications for EVD is evidence that
markets cannot reliably supply treatments for epidemic
diseases where the number of affected individuals is
small. Second, the public infrastructure needed to prevent and control an infectious disease outbreak has been
eroded in many West African nations over the past 40
years. Alongside war, political instability and corruption,
the collapse of social infrastructure has resulted from
structural adjustment and trade liberalisation programs
promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank. We need to understand these political
and economic problems as the conditions underlying
disease outbreaks.5

Therapeutic innovation has not trickled down
Since EVD was identified almost 40 years ago, the scientific community has been able to accelerate research and
develop prevention and containment strategies for other
worrying emerging infectious diseases, such as those
caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus,6 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus and Hendra virus.
So why has this not occurred with Ebola?
Part of the reason is that the normal drivers of drug
research and development — pharmaceutical companies
operating in a global marketplace — have failed to develop effective treatments or vaccines for highly virulent
and destructive diseases affecting only small numbers
of very poor people in sporadic outbreaks. Researchers,
investors and company directors may recognise humanitarian needs but cannot tolerate the economic risks.
Instead, pharmaceutical companies focus on conditions
or diseases that involve large markets involving more
affluent and regular consumers of their products, where
larger profits can be generated.7
Nevertheless, despite the economic disincentives, several small companies have been developing drugs and
vaccines against EVD. There are products in pretrial
readiness, and Phase II clinical trials for promising EVD
therapies are expected soon and may have benefit in this
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Summary


The current outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West
Africa is the worst so far.



The unprecedented extent of mortality and morbidity
in this outbreak has followed more from imposition of
neoliberal economic policies on the countries affected
than from the biological virulence of Ebola virus.



The lack of vaccines and medications for Ebola virus
disease is evidence that markets cannot reliably supply
treatments for epidemic diseases.



We attribute the current difficulties in containment
chieﬂy to the erosion or non-development of the
health and medical infrastructure needed to respond
effectively, as a direct result of market-privileging
policies imposed in the interests of wealthy nations.



These events and responses hold lessons for public
health priorities in Australia.

outbreak.8,9 However, it seems that these developments
are not motivated primarily by humanitarian considerations — to save African lives — but rather by the desire to
safeguard Western nations against emerging infectious
diseases and weaponised infectious agents.10,11

Therapeutic innovation is part of a security
agenda
Established by the United States Government after the anthrax attacks of 2001, the Biomedical Advanced Research
and Development Authority (BARDA) has stockpiled vast
quantities of therapeutic agents in readiness for various
forms of perceived biological threat to US citizens. BARDA
and the US military medical services, in partnership
with hundreds of small biotechnology companies, have
developed medical countermeasures against infectious
agents with potential for use in terrorist or military activity. Three of the agents funded by these partnerships
are in the early stages of development as countermeasures against EVD. Research into ZMapp, the monoclonal
antibody therapy given experimentally to a very small
number of infected people in the current outbreak, was
funded by the US Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases and Public Health Agency of Canada7
as part of this biodefence program. In Australia, the
CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation) and US military medical services collaborated to produce the Hendra virus antiserum and related
equine vaccine.12
These partnerships reflect a worldwide shift of public
health focus from disease prevention towards the biosecurity of wealthy nations, their preparedness for disease
outbreaks and protection of their economic interests.
Lakoff describes two complementary regimes of global
health: one focused on security systems that mitigate
threats to Western countries, and one focused on humanitarian disease control in the developing world, with
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the second regime functioning as a palliation against the
first.13 Wealthy nations’ stockpiling of medicines in the
face of any threat, and the production costs of sophisticated therapies such as ZMapp,5,7,8 lessen the availability
of such medicines to people in impoverished nations. The
effect is to reinforce a division between a small, privileged group of wealthy nations and a majority of poorer
countries with limited access to needed health resources.
Under this current paradigm, it is unclear how much
the developing world will benefit in practice from new
medications and vaccines.

Inequality extends ethical challenges to
therapeutic innovation
The immediate use of untried experimental medicines
has led to a pressing ethical debate on how to best allocate
the use of ZMapp. Questions have been raised about why
the very limited stock was at first only given to two US
citizens and a Spanish citizen, and not to affected people
resident in West Africa.14,15 Deploying untested products
among vulnerable patients in impoverished nations and
communities recalls a long history of non-consensual, exploitive drug trials. Ineffective or harmful treatments (as
may prove to be the case for ZMapp) would risk a costly
breakdown of trust in health care workers and public
health programs. The report of an ethics panel, hastily
convened by the WHO — without representatives from
West Africa — to advise on these issues underscores the
ethical challenges that result from social disparity when
confronting experimental interventions in emergency
contexts. These challenges include the question of who
might authorise the use of experimental treatments — for
instance, the Liberian government did not approve the
investigational use of drugs.16
Comparison of the failure of market incentives to
produce widely available and efficacious drugs via the
pharmaceutical industry with the success of preserving
the biosecurity interests of IMF and G20 member nations
reveals a disturbing feature of neoliberal policy making
on a global scale. These policies have resulted in privileging the economic and security interests of the nations
developing the policies — including Australia — while
disempowering those of poor countries and governments.

Infrastructure and the ethics of containment
Development of effective vaccines and treatments is
crucial. However, health care and social infrastructure,
resources and behaviour — much more than virulence
— determine the extent of mortality and morbidity in
an outbreak. We know the importance of health infrastructure and proven and inexpensive infection control
measures in containing EVD.5 But market-privileging
economic and social policies, imposed on West African
nations to secure Western economic interests, have eroded
needed physical and social infrastructure over decades.3,7
Governments of poorer countries accepting structural
adjustment program loans from the IMF and World Bank,
aiming to increase economic growth, were required to
introduce austerity measures, transform agriculture to

focus on export commodity crops, reduce tariffs and allow foreign investment. Public infrastructure in disrepair,
undercutting of rural livelihoods and increased food
insecurity have resulted.17,18
In these circumstances, preventing and containing
infectious disease outbreaks is very difficult. Most experts cite a lack of even basic sanitary facilities, sterile
needles, personal protective equipment and other health
infrastructure. Once the disease had spread into dense
urban areas and across four nations, the resources of
governments and non-government organisations, such
as Médecins Sans Frontières, were stretched beyond
capacity.19
Even former US President Bill Clinton, a proponent of
free markets, is one of many who have acknowledged
the devastating impact of IMF and World Bank policies
on agricultural sectors in Africa and their flow-on effects
on social stability, infrastructure and health.20 The recent
EVD outbreak and the responses to it have not developed
inevitably but in circumstances intricately linked to the
economic and political interests of resource-rich nations
like Australia.3,5,7
The international public health response to EVD is
humanitarian in focus. But it too is structurally inseparable from the political and economic determinants of the
outbreak.21 The WHO-coordinated best-practice containment efforts — including advocacy for local health infrastructure and respectful, sensitive partnerships with local
healers and communities — has met with some success.22
However, the International Health Regulations, which
govern WHO disease management and response, are part
of the security agenda identified by Lakoff,13 in which
expensive surveillance systems and response teams are
given priority over investment in local disease prevention and public health infrastructure.23,24 Meanwhile, aid
money remains explicitly within what wealthy nations
term “international development” — a process that imposes their economic priorities on local populations.18

Containment, culture and economics
Western media depict African culture, rather than the
absence of basic health services and diagnostic laboratories, as a major barrier to containment.3 Traditional
burial practices are seen to facilitate EVD transmission;
likewise, superstitious, ineffectual traditional medicines
are perceived to promote risky exposure and/or behaviour conducive to EVD spread. Specific cultural practices
are not unimportant, but structural determinants have
a much greater overall impact, especially in the crucial
early stages when the outbreak spread so widely. Culture
has not proven to be such a barrier to containment in
the past.3,19 In Nigeria, standard control measures, such
as patient isolation, personal protective equipment and
hospital hygiene, have successfully limited the outbreak
so far to 12 people.22
In a global response to EVD, research and development
of effective drugs should not be the only or even the dominant strategy; EVD can be prevented and contained by
standard public health sanitary and hygiene measures.2
Investing in better health services is in the interests of all
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West Africans and would be a longer lasting and more
effective use of money. This would enable a swift response
to this or any other infectious disease outbreak — and,
globally, that would be in all our interests.
Though seemingly far removed from Australia, the
West African outbreak of EVD has two lessons for us.
At the international level, Australia, as a member nation
of the IMF and soon-to-be host of the G20, has a role in
the effects of neoliberal policies, including the structural
adjustment programs in West Africa and in our own
region. Australia has a responsibility to ensure its representatives are not pursuing economic or security interests
that leave developing nations vulnerable to devastating
disease risks.
At a domestic, more tangible level, this outbreak reminds us that Australia needs to maintain the strength
of its own public health infrastructure and access to primary care. This requires the Australian Government to
invest in, rather than make cuts to, social services, and
to maintain public funding for research into areas that
commercial interests do not pursue. For example, the
recent proposal to cut funding to the CSIRO25 is troubling,
as these structural shifts in research funding allocation
could have significant long-term impacts on the community’s health. It is not so much the fear and chaos
of an EVD outbreak that should worry us but the more
mundane policy decisions that occur behind closed doors.
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